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Adequacy of the 1995
Antitrust Guidelines
for IP Licensing:
Commentaries from
the 2002 FTC and DOJ
Hearings
By Clovia Hamilton
n 1995, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) adopted new guidelines for the
licensing of intellectual property rights without violating
antitrust laws. The 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the
Licensing of Intellectual Property (IP Guidelines) state the
antitrust enforcement policy of the DOJ and the FTC.1 The
IP Guidelines drafted by the DOJ and FTC (the agencies)
does not provide practitioners with a sufficient level of
comfort as they attempt to predict the enforcement initiatives relative to intellectual property licensing.2 The IP
Guidelines are inadequate because they misunderstand the
nature of intellectual property markets and provide insufficient guidance in the most difficult areas. The IP
Guidelines include a special treatment of a newly defined
“innovation market” that is flawed and lack a focus on
license-misuse activity that creates entry barriers. Antitrust
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and patent law practitioners have heavily debated the IP
Guidelines.
To address these concerns, in November 2001, the
agencies held hearings on “Competition and Intellectual
Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based
Economy,” which were held between February and
November 2002.3 The hearings took place over 24 days at
the University of California’s Haas School of Business and
in Washington, DC, and involved more than 300 panelists
of representatives of high-tech industries and law firms, the
independent inventor community, leading patent and
antitrust organizations, and scholars in economics and
patent and antitrust law.4
In October 2003, the FTC issued a report entitled “To
Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition
and Patent Law and Policy” focused on the patent law system.5 A second report by both agencies is forthcoming and
will make similar recommendations for the antitrust law
enforcement system.6 This article discusses whether the
FTC has addressed the three common types of license misuse, that is, the refusal to grant intellectual property licenses; misconduct during industry standards setting; and the
improper acquisition of broad intellectual property rights
through patent settlement agreements involving patent
pools, cross-licenses, and generic drug market entry.
Generic drug entry has attracted a great deal of interest in
light of the diversion of distribution from wholesalers to the
multibillion-dollar shadow market over the Internet, and
the controversial Medicare Bill.7
REFUSING TO LICENSE
Refusing to license a patent can sometimes constitute
improper exclusionary conduct. In the 1992 pre-IP
Guidelines case Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Services, Inc., the Supreme Court considered the unilateral
refusal to sell or license a patented or copyrighted product
and tying arrangements.8 Although Section 5.3 of the 1995
IP Guidelines cites Eastman Kodak,9 the IP Guidelines do
not provide much guidance in the area of exclusionary conduct.10 Section 5.5 of the IP Guidelines states that exclusion
from a licensing arrangement among competing technologies is unlikely to have anticompetitive effects “unless (1)
excluded firms cannot effectively compete in the relevant
market for the good incorporating the licensed technologies
and (2) the pool participants collectively possess market
power in the relevant market.”11 If these circumstances
exist, the agencies will evaluate whether the arrangement’s
limitations on participation are reasonably related to
exploiting and developing the pooled technologies and will
assess the net effect of those limitations in the relevant market.12 The IP Guidelines do not provide adequate guidance
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for determining whether and when refusing to license or sell
patented technology or copyrighted work is justified as a
legitimate business decision. The IP Guidelines merely state
that the agencies will determine whether a licensing
restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve pro-competitive
efficiencies.13 Specific examples of pro-competitive efficiencies or business justifications are not provided.
In Eastman Kodak, Kodak took exclusionary action by
implementing a policy to stop selling its replacement parts
to independent service organizations (ISOs) and by securing agreements with other parts manufacturers not to sell
parts to ISOs.14 The ISOs alleged that Kodak’s new policy of
selling replacement parts only to Kodak machine owners
that purchased Kodak’s repair services constituted both
monopolization and attempted monopolization of the market for Kodak repair services under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act and a per se illegal tying arrangement under
Section 1.15
Kodak proffered three business justifications for its
restrictive parts policy: (1) it wanted to guard against inadequate service to its customers because of its commitment
to quality service; (2) it needed to control and lower its
inventory costs; and (3) it desired to prevent the ISOs from
free-riding on its capital investment in its equipment industry.16 The Supreme Court held that these reasons were insufficient and pre-textual and that the proffered business
justifications really did not play a part in Kodak’s decision
to implement this policy to refuse to sell or license.17
There was evidence that Kodak had control over the
availability of parts, resulting in excluded service competition, increased service prices, and forced unwilling consumption of Kodak service.18 The Supreme Court
determined that Kodak controlled approximately 100 percent of the single-brand parts market and 80 percent to 95
percent of the service market with no readily available substitutes.19 In Eastman Kodak, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the Times-Picayune principle that power gained naturally
from a patent or copyright can give rise to antitrust liability
if a seller exploits its dominant position in one market to
expand its empire into the next.20
After the Supreme Court remanded Eastman Kodak,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s jury verdict in
favor of the ISOs.21 Thus, refusal to deal in the complex
high-tech market for photocopier and micrographics equipment, and its derivative aftermarket, proved detrimental to
Kodak. Kodak was required to sell all of its patented parts to
ISOs for a period of 10 years, and after trebling damages, the
ISOs obtained a judgment of $ 71.8 million.22 The Ninth
Circuit held that, “unlike the other cases involving refusals
to license patents, this case concerns a blanket refusal that
included protected and unprotected products.”23 The presumption that refusing to license or sell is justified by legit-

imate business reasons may be rebutted by evidence that the
monopolist acquired the intellectual property unlawfully,
attempted to gain a monopoly beyond the grant of a patent,
or relied on a pretextual business justification to mask anticompetitive conduct.24 Here, there was evidence that the
proffered business justification really did not play a part in
the decision to act.25 Kodak’s parts manager testified that
patent rights did not cross his mind at the time the policy
to exclude ISOs was implemented.26
Kodak held patents for more than 220 parts needed to
service its photocopiers.27 Before Eastman Kodak, no court
had ever compelled a patentee to license a valid patent, as
doing so imposed antitrust liability on a patentee for refusing to license.28 The significance of a monopolist’s unilateral refusal to sell or license a patented or copyrighted product
in the context of a Section 2 claim based on monopoly
leveraging was a question of first impression.29 In fact, the
DOJ had not filed a Section 2 case, nor said much about the
issue.30 The Ninth Circuit held that the mere desire to protect intellectual property is not in and of itself a legitimate
business justification.31
Rather than helping to alleviate this confusion, the
1995 IP Guidelines do not provide much guidance on
exclusionary conduct in the form of the refusal to license or
sell intellectual property. The agencies should provide guidance on: (1) what types of business justification arguments
are valid; (2) when reliance on a business justification is a
pretext to mask anticompetitive conduct; and (3) how a
claim of legitimate business justification can be rebutted
with evidence that the refusal involved intellectual property that was unlawfully acquired, such as by patent misuse, a
combination of protected and unprotected products, or a
monopoly beyond the grant of a patent or statutory copyright grant.
The Federal Circuit, on the other hand, has upheld
refusals to license as proper use of the patent monopoly. The
2000 post-IP Guidelines CSU v. Xerox case32 arose out of a
class action antitrust lawsuit with facts very similar to those
of Eastman Kodak. In 1984, Xerox established a parts policy
in which it refused to sell parts to CSU and other ISOs.33
The district court concluded that a monopolist’s refusal to
license its patented or copyrighted product could never give
rise to antitrust liability on the ground that such a refusal to
license is immune from antitrust scrutiny.34 In considering
the effect of Xerox’s unilateral right to refuse to license
copyrighted manuals and diagnostic software on liability
under the antitrust laws, the Federal Circuit in CSU
embraced the First Circuit’s approach on liability under the
antitrust laws.35
The First Circuit’s approach was set out in Data General
Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp., in which it stated that copyright monopolies are based on Congress’
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assumption that the right to exclude others creates a system
of incentives that promotes consumer welfare by encouraging investment in the creation of expressive work.36
Applying this principle to CSU, the Federal Circuit concluded that exclusionary conduct could include a monopolist’s refusal to license.37 This is presumed to be a legitimate
business justification; the antitrust plaintiff has the burden
to overcome this presumption.38 The Federal Circuit rejected CSU’s invitation to examine Xerox’s subjective motivation in asserting its right to exclude under the copyright laws
for pretext.39
In November 2001, the FTC Chairman Tim Muris listed the purposes for the Hearings.40 With regards to refusals to
deal, Muris stated that commentators have had varied
responses to the CSU decision.41 Some do not follow the
CSU decision and believe in an antitrust inquiry as to
whether the alleged monopolist sacrificed profit in order to
exclude competition and in return created additional market power.42 Others follow the CSU decision and believe
that in absence of misuse such as filing improper infringement suits or engaging in unlawful tying, a patent owner
has an absolute right to refuse to license to others.43
Muris also mentioned that some have argued that the
Federal Circuit’s decision appears to find substantial support in the plain language of 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4), which
states that no patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for
infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or be
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent
right by reason of his having refused to license or use any
rights to the patent.44 Muris questioned whether 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(d)(4) should be changed or reinterpreted to reflect
competition considerations; and stated that this is one of
the issues that would be discussed in the upcoming hearings.45
In addition, in February 2002, Charles James of the
DOJ provided opening day comments at the Hearings on
several issues of concern.46 James stated that, during the
course of the Hearings, the agencies would “encourage participants to examine the degree to which holders of intellectual property are refusing to grant licenses, and whether
such refusals to license raise competitive concerns…[and]
facilitate discussion of the current jurisprudence in this
area, including how it is affecting current licensing practices and if there are circumstances in which a refusal to
license may raise antitrust concerns.”47
Unfortunately, the recent October 2003 FTC report
about the Hearings does not adequately address refusals to
deal. Although this report is intended to make recommendations targeted at improving the patent law system, it did
not answer Muris’ inquiry about 35 U.S.C. 271(d)(4) in
light of the CSU decision.
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MISCONDUCT DURING
S TA N D A R D S S E T T I N G
The setting of industry standards also can be anticompetitive. Section 5.5 of the IP Guidelines, which covers
cross-licensing and pooling arrangements, states that a possible anticompetitive effect may occur if participants are
discouraged from engaging in research and development.48
For example, a pooling arrangement requiring members to
grant licenses to each other for current and future technology at minimal cost may suppress technology by reducing
the incentive to engage in research and development,
because members of the pool have to share their successful
research and development and each of the members can
free-ride on the accomplishments of other pool members.49
This may be true of standards-setting organizations that, to
some extent, have similar structures and purposes as joint
ventures.50
As a practical commercial matter, licensees generally
want exclusive rights to justify the significant effort and
expense incurred in exploiting high technology. The 1995
IP Guidelines do not specifically address participation and
conduct in industry standards-setting groups that are
prevalent in the high-technology arena. The IP Guidelines
should have addressed the potential for monopolies in the
development of high-technology standards and interface
specifications. Industry standards are agreed upon specifications for the production of functionally compatible
goods and services and are vital to many aspects of the
economy, since they may be the only way to ensure that
technology are compatible with each other.51 The line
between beneficial standards and standards used as anticompetitive devices must be made clearer.
DE FACTO STANDARDS SETTING
The two types of standards setting are de facto and de
jure. De facto standards setting occurs when a standard
achieves a critical mass and dominates an industry.52
Companies that set de facto industry standards have tremendous economic power in that they can control the interfaces to the products for which they set the standard.53 If
competitors cannot interface with the standards-setting
product, then that competitor cannot compete effectively.54
Thus, interfaces may actually define relevant markets.55
Further, standards setting can have anticompetitive effects
if it thwarts innovation by advocating an older standard
when a newer, better, or more widely accepted technology
is available.56 Standards setting might also provide a forum
for collusion, such as selecting a standard designed to preclude the use or acceptance of another’s product.57
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The personal computer software industry exhibits a
particular set of conditions known to economists as network
effects.58 A network effect is present when the value of a
product or service increases with the cumulative number of
purchases, and each additional purchase raises the value of
the product to existing users as well as the expected value of
the product to future adopters.59 For example, Netscape uses
the network effect by not charging anything but increasing
the value of its product and itself.60 Network effects permit
a market’s first entrant to achieve domination of a market
by getting a head start in building an installed base of users
that increase the value of that first entrant’s product.61
In November 1995, the FTC conducted hearings on
global and innovation-based competition to consider networks, standards, foreclosure, and strategic conduct.62
Robert Kohn of Borland International discussed the
monopoly in standard interface specifications.63 Kohn stated that users adopt a particular interface standard by investing time and resources in learning how to operate the
product efficiently.64 Users increase this investment by purchasing complementary products that are compatible with
the interface standard of the original product.65 Ultimately,
a market leader in control of an interface standard may substantially raise the cost to consumers of switching to alternative product offerings of subsequent market entrants, and
these alternative products might actually be better, cheaper,
and more innovative.66
Further, promoting innovation is a function of properly circumscribing the scope of intellectual property protection and enforcing antitrust laws to prevent monopoly
control over interface standards. For example, Microsoft
controls the desktop computer operating system standard.67
With respect to this operating system, Microsoft won a
$13.6 million judgment against Stac Electronics for the
misappropriation of its trade secrets.68 A federal jury awarded Stac $120 million for patent infringement and Microsoft
the $13.6 million for trade secret misuse and required the
parties to enter into a broad cross-licensing agreement.69
In addition to the potential for a market leader in control of an industry standard to raise the cost to consumers,
there is potential for exclusionary conduct. According to
Robert Kohn, Stac would be out of business if Microsoft had
refused to license to it.70 Kohn recommended requiring
compulsory licensing of the source code, subject to a modest royalty that implements the interface standard in order
to allow competitors to develop complementary products.71
Absent such licensing, the users of original software programs will face switching costs if the software is not allowed
to be compatible or if follow-on firms are not allowed zeropriced access to de facto industry standards.72 When a competitor so dominates a market by becoming the sole
standards-setting authority, its power must be carefully

monitored or actively constrained if innovation in related
markets is not to be suppressed.73
The lengthy legal battle between the Addamax
Corporation and the Open Software Foundation (OSF)
raised the issue of de facto industry standards setting.74
Addamax produced B-1 rated security software systems for
the computer industry. The OSF is a high-tech joint
research and development venture registered under the
National Cooperative Research and Production Act of
1984.75 Eight computer manufacturers established the OSF
in 1988, including Hewlett-Packard and Digital, to conduct
computer interface research and experimentation and to
produce and promote a software alternative to the UNIX
operating system.76
Addamax lost a bid for the development of OSF’s security software and alleged that OSF’s conduct with respect to
its de facto industry standards had an anticompetitive
impact on the industry because OSF allegedly had conspired to force the price for security software down below
the free-market level, limiting Addamax’s ability to compete.77 The courts did not explore the market issue but
examined the causal connection between Addamax’s business and OSF’s alleged monopsony power.78 The courts held
that antitrust violations were not the material cause of
Addamax’s business failure because the security software
market is a high-risk business and Addamax’s product was
too expensive and complex.79
Had OSF’s selection of a security software platform
been viewed as a desire to set a de facto industry standard, as
opposed to merely selecting the lowest bidder, OSF’s selection could have been considered an anticompetitive means
to preclude the use or acceptance of Addamax’s product.
The FTC, however, has stated that OSF’s actions seemed
innocently consistent with competitive rivalry; moreover,
OSF’s actions were mitigated by the fact that the joint venture was designed to counter AT&T/Sun’s alleged attempts
to dominate the industry with the UNIX operating system.80
Given the courts’ holdings that all high-tech software business deals are risky and the FTC’s view that this is merely a
case of competitive rivalry, Addamax did not have a chance
to prevail.
DE JURE STANDARDS SETTING
De jure standards setting occurs when an industry group
or consortia adopts standards.81 For example, in February
1992, Dell Computer Corporation joined the Video
Electronics Standards Association (VESA), which is composed of all of the major US computer hardware and software manufacturers.82 In August 1992, VESA adopted a
final standard for a computer bus design, the VL-bus, for
transferring instructions between a computer’s central pro-
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cessing unit and peripherals.83 In line with the common
practice of de jure industry standards-setting organizations,
VESA required that participants disclose their intellectual
property rights to one another, and Dell representatives certified on several occasions that the VESA proposal did not
infringe on any of their patents.84
After the VESA VL-bus design was adopted and incorporated into more than one million computers, Dell
revealed that it obtained a VL-bus patent in 1991 and
announced that it intended to enforce the patent by requiring patent licenses from users of its design.85 In 1995, the
FTC charged Dell with violating Section 5 of the FTC Act,
which covers unfair methods of competition, because of its
failure to disclose its patents during open-standards deliberations.86 The FTC complained that Dell’s actions unreasonably restrained competition by hindering the industry’s
acceptance of the VL-bus design standard, raising the costs
of implementing the standard and chilling the willingness
to participate in future standards-setting activities.87 Dell
subsequently signed a consent decree with the FTC that
prohibited the company from enforcing any of the patents
it failed to disclose to the standards group for 10 years.88
Hitachi cited the FTC case against Dell when it alleged
that Rambus had violated the rules of the standards-setting
body called Joint Electron Devices Engineering Council
(JEDEC).89 Hitachi alleged that Rambus had tried to
restrain trade by refusing to reveal its patent enforcement
intentions during open standards-setting discussions in the
early 1990s.90 Rambus has enforced its proprietary
Synchronous DRAM (S-DRAM) by forcing memory chipmakers to pay royalties.91 Although Hitachi has argued that
Rambus’s technology is an open industry standard, Samsung
Electronics, Oki Electric Industry, Elpida Memory,
Mitsubishi Electric, Toshiba, and Hitachi all agreed to
license the patents and pay Rambus royalties.92 Hyundai
Electronics Industries, Micron technology, and Infineon
Technologies sued Rambus on this issue.93
In 2000, the Assistant Director of the FTC Bureau of
Competition advised that standards should not overreach,
should not restrict or define the product more than necessary, should not be applied to just members but to nonmembers as well, and should not do anything to stifle
innovation.94
In November 2001, Timothy Muris discussed standards
setting when listing the various purposes of the Hearings.95
Muris stated that standards setting is an area that illustrates
the tension between antitrust and intellectual property policy, and knowledge-based standards that rely on intellectual property can raise difficult competition issues.96
Muris mentioned the 1992 Dell case and discussed a
1985 case involving the American Society of Sanitary
Engineering (ASSE).97 The ASSE had a policy of refusing
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to develop a standard for a product that is patented or manufactured by only one manufacturer because the existing
manufacturers did not sanction an innovative product
unless they could also produce it.98 The FTC entered into a
consent order that “required, among other things, that the
ASSE stop refusing requests for issuance of a standard or
modification of an existing standard for a product merely
because only one or a small number of manufacturers patent
or make the product.”99
According to Muris, some commentators have argued
that standards that rely on patent rights present a great danger to competition since the standard might give the technology owners unwarranted market power by excluding
innovative, patented products from the standards-setting
process itself or by placing too great a burden on businesses
and thus deter firms from participating in the standard-setting organization in the first place, thereby hindering innovation.100 Muris concluded that “we could all benefit from
a more complete understanding of the standard-setting
process.”101 This begs the question of whether the October
2003 FTC report on the Hearings did indeed provide a
more complete understanding of potential anticompetive
behavior, which is lacking in the IP Guidelines.
In February 2002, on the opening day of the Hearings,
Charles James of the DOJ mentioned that one goal for the
Hearings is “to improve our understanding of how various
standard setting practices promote innovation and competition, and how various practices might result in abuses of
market power or disincentives for innovation.”102
According to James, with respect to technical standards for
digitizing data have proven vital for the usefulness and
commercial viability of Internet communications and
other products because after a standard has been established, there are many issues regarding access to the technology embodied in the standard.103 “[L]imited access could
restrict the number of competitors in a market and severely inhibit entry. In some cases, we might want to consider
whether consumer welfare is best served by having the
industry settle on a single standard or by encouraging the
development of multiple competing standards. We will
encourage participants in these hearings to discuss the
influence of intellectual property and antitrust law on real
world standard setting.”104
Unfortunately, the October 2003 FTC Report did not
address these concerns. Hopefully, the proposed joint
FTC/DOJ report will do so. There has been an increase in
legal actions against misconduct in the standards-setting
process. The increase in legal actions against the manipulation of the standards-setting process is evidence that the
agencies should have provided guidance on this matter in
their IP Guidelines and in the October 2003 Hearings
report.
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PAT E N T A C C U M U L AT I O N A N D
SETTLEMENTS

CROSS-LICENSING AND PATENT POOLS
“Cross-licensing, package licenses or patent pools are
created to enable all participants to use the intellectual
property where, without the licenses, perhaps none could
do so because of possible or probable infringement.”105 The
IP Guidelines state that the joint marketing of pooled intellectual property with collective price setting or coordinated
output restrictions may have anticompetitive effects.106 The
IP Guidelines, however, do not adequately address the entry
barrier problem of acquiring broader protection for narrow
inventions and the combination of patent rights by crosslicensing.107
In 1981, a former Deputy Attorney General for
Economics advised that the DOJ should bring an antitrust
action when a company with a dominant position enters
into extensive cross-licenses with competitors and the
licenses featured restrictions on the availability of licenses
to new entrants.108 Thus, practitioners would benefit greatly from a thorough discussion of legitimate and insufficient
transactions in the IP Guidelines.
In 1997, the DOJ suggested that it is likely to scrutinize
patent cross-licenses and settlements of infringement suits
to a greater degree.109 The DOJ proposed a notification procedure to enable it to investigate significant cross-licenses,
licenses in general, and patent infringement suit settlement
agreements.110 Joel Klein, the Acting Assistant Attorney
General at the time, stated that cross-licenses had previously remained largely off the DOJ’s agenda.111 Perhaps this is
why the discussion of cross-licensing and settlement agreements is limited in the IP Guidelines.
Practitioners must look elsewhere for guidance, and the
DOJ Business Review Letters are helpful. For example, in
December 1998, pursuant to the DOJ Business Review
Procedure,112 the DOJ provided a statement of its enforcement intentions with respect to a proposed arrangement in
which Koninklijke Philips Electronics would assemble, offer
a package license, and distribute royalty income under
Philips, Sony, and Pioneer Electronic patents.113 Allegedly,
the patents are essential to the manufacturing of Digital
Versatile Discs (DVDs) and players in compliance with the
DVD-ROM and DVD-Video formats.114 Essential patents
have no substitutes and must be licensed in order to comply
with standard specifications.115
The DOJ stated that, by reducing what would otherwise be three licensing transactions into one, the pool
would reduce transaction costs for licensors and licensees
alike.116 Also, “by ensuring that each Licensor’s patents will

not be blocked by those of the other two, the pool would
enhance the value of all three Licensors’ patents.”117 The
DOJ concluded that the proposed arrangement is not likely
to initiate antitrust enforcement action against the proposed cross-license because the combination would lower
costs to manufacturers that need access to the essential
patents in order to produce discs and players in conformity
with the DVD-Video and DVD-ROM formats.118
Another example is a 1999 DOJ statement of its
enforcement intentions with respect to a proposed arrangement whereby the Toshiba Corporation would assemble
and offer a package license with Hitachi, Matsushita
Electrical Industrial, Mitsubishi Electric, and Time Warner
for DVD-Rom and DVD-Video formats.119 Again, the DOJ
concluded that the proposed arrangement was not likely to
initiate antitrust enforcement action against the proposed
cross-license because the combination would lower the
costs of manufacturers that need access to essential patents
in order to produce conforming products.120
Conceptually, the problem of patent accumulation is
indistinguishable from the merger problem under antitrust
law.121 In the merger analysis, combinations and collusions
eliminate competition from competing patents that would
drive royalty rates down to the point at which each patentee could hope to charge a royalty that merely reflected the
degree to which its patent was more valuable than others.122
As with competing patents, there is a significant danger
that the cross-licensing of complementary patents will mask
price fixing conspiracies.123
The cross-licensing of intellectual property rights is
sometimes the product of the settlement of an infringement
suits. Patent settlements can be an efficient means to avoid
litigation, and in general, courts favor settlements.124 They
are not, however, immune from antitrust scrutiny. The IP
Guidelines provide that, when cross-licensing involves horizontal competitors, the agencies will consider whether the
effect of the settlement is to diminish competition among
parties that would have been actual or likely competitors in
a relevant market in the absence of the cross-license.125 “In
the absence of offsetting efficiencies, such settlements may
be challenged as unlawful restraints of trade.”126 Examples of
offsetting efficiencies include the anticipated lower manufacturing costs cited in the aforementioned DOJ business
review letters and the decision by the owner of weaker
patents to license them only as a package since they might
be more valuable and productive as a packaged license.127
Cross-licensing remains largely missing from the DOJ’s
agenda. Therefore, there is a need for more guidance on the
entry barrier problem of gaining broad protection for narrow inventions, combining patents and/or other intellectual property, by cross-licensing, using cross-licensing to mask
price fixing conspiracies, or using settlement agreements to
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diminish competition. According to DOJ Business Review
Letters, legitimate transactions include those that prevent
blocked patents, enhance patent value, and lower costs to
manufacturers that need access to essential patents.
The October 2003 FTC Report mentions that the
Business Review Letters discuss features that reduce competitive concerns.128 However, it does not recommend any
changes to the IP Guidelines about patent pools, crosslicensing, or patent settlement agreements.
GENERIC DRUG MARKET ENTRY
With respect to the purpose of the Hearings, in
November 2001, Timothy Muris discussed pharmaceutical
patent settlements as related to the 1984 Hatch-Waxman
Act.129 Muris discussed the FTC’s investigations of patent
settlements between the manufacturers of pioneer drugs
and competing generic drugs.130 The concern is that some
settlements might deter generic market entry by paying
generic entrants to not compete beyond the limitations
already imposed, such as by patent law and the HatchWaxman Act.131
In July 2002, the FTC released a report titled “Generic
Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study” on
a study of the generic drug industry’s activities between
1992 and 2000 that is intended to provide a more complete
picture of how generic competition has developed under
Hatch-Waxman.132 The study involved 28 brand-name
companies and more than 50 generic drug companies.133 It
recommends legislative action designed to ensure that the
180-day exclusivity and the 30-month stay provisions of the
Hatch-Waxman Amendments do not delay generic drug
entry to market.134 The FTC’s recommendations would permit only automatic 30-month stay on the entry of a generic drug (per drug product, per generic entry application, and
only resolve infringement disputes over patents listed in the
“Orange Book”) prior to the filing of the generic’s entry
application during pending patent-infringement litigation.135 The FTC supports new legislation that would
require brand-name companies and first generic applicants
to provide copies of certain agreements to the FTC and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) for review.136
Under the current law, Hatch-Waxman requires the
applicant to state either that the patents for the brandname drug products are invalid or not infringed by the
generic product, technically, a Paragraph IV certification.137
“[I]f a brand-name lists an additional patent in the Orange
Book after the generic has filed its application, the generic
firm would be required to re-certify to this later-listed
patent. If the branded firm then sued the generic manufacturer within 45 days claiming patent infringement, generic
entry would be stayed for an additional 30 months [under
Hatch-Waxman].”138 Therefore, some brand-name manufacturers list additional patents in the Food and Drug
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Administration (FDA) Orange Book shortly before their
original patents expire, enabling them to file patent
infringement suits against generic drug firms. The concern
is that brand-name manufacturers may be acquiring overly
broad, invalid additional patents. The 180-day marketing
exclusivity period has enabled generic and branded companies to enter into agreements that had the potential to stay
the 180-day period for some time. In these circumstances,
the first generic applicant does not trigger the running of
the 180 days, so the FDA is prevented from approving any
other generic applicants to enter the market.139
“During the time period covered by the study (19922000), the report states, there were 20 settlements of patent
litigation related to generic entry prior to patent expiration
. . . [and] 14 of the 20 had the potential to delay the start of
the generic applicant’s 180-day marketing exclusivity.”140
Although the October 2003 FTC report is intended to
address patent related concerns such as these, there is no
mention of generic drug market entry (i.e., the listing of
patents in the Orange Book, patent related settlement
agreements).
In addition, in February 2002, during the opening day
comments at the Hearings, Charles James discussed patent
pooling.141 James stated that the agencies are interested in
facilitating discussion of collective intellectual property
rights organizations created by patent pools, patent settlement, and cross-licensing agreements involving new (or
generic) technology that is covered by many overlapping
intellectual property rights.142
James mentioned the business review process of proposals to jointly license patents to an MPEG patent pool (a
video compression technology) and two DVD patent
pools.143 In each of these cases, the DOJ concluded that the
proposed arrangements did not appear to pose antitrust concerns since the pools (1) would license only those patents
essential for a manufacturer to comply with an established
standard; (2) were designed to capture the efficiencies that
may come from licensing complementary technologies; and
(3) were designed to limit the anticompetitive effect that
can arise from pooling technology (such as the elimination
of competition or the increase in prices that could arise if
substitute technologies) were placed in a pool.144 According
to James, the Hearing would explore “a number of broad
questions about patents pools, such as whether pools actually result in the competitive problems they are hypothesized to cause and whether the antitrust authorities have
focused on the right criteria when evaluating patent
pools…how the term “essential” should be defined and
whether the identity of the administrator of the pool matters.”145
Unfortunately, the October 2003 FTC report on the
Hearings did not address these issues. It addressed only the
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general issue of whether the US Patent and Trademark
Office is issuing overly broad, invalid patents.146
With respect to access to affordable pharmaceuticals,
on November 25, 2003, the controversial Medicare bill’s
conference report cleared.147 It included amendments to
patent provisions in Title 35 that modify the patent
enforcement mechanisms as to generic drugs.148 There is a
special infringement liability created by 35 USC §
271(e)(2) for generic entrants seeking pre-market approval
by the FDA of drugs subject to patents listed in the Orange
Book. House Resolution 1 “includes provisions that: (1)
limit patentees to a single 30-month stay of FDA approval
for a generic drug . . .; (2) give a drug applicant standing to
bring a declaratory judgment against a patentee that fails to
sue under 35 USC § 271(e)(2) within the 45-day time
limit; (3) gives drug applicants that are sued under Section
271(e)(2) the right to assert a counterclaim that challenges
the relevant patent information listed in the FDA Orange
Book; (4) allow damages determinations in infringement
suits to consider the propriety of the Orange Book listings;
and (5) forfeit the generic drug 180-day exclusivity period
on evidence of an anti-competitive deal between the generic and patented drug companies.”149
In conclusion, it is a necessitated that the proposed
joint FTC/DOJ report on intellectual property and competition law address the continuing concerns about patent settlements related to both cross-licensing and patent pools
and generic drug entry.

The mere fact that the agencies have chosen to report
the findings and recommendations from the Hearings in a
bifurcated manner signified the tension between antitrust
law, which seeks to prevent monopolization, and patent
law, which grants monopolies. Alternatively, this bifurcated
report process could merely be a stall tactic to further delay
providing practitioners with the clear guidance needed
when licensing intellectual property in high-tech industries.
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